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From the Enlightenment to Crawford to Holmes
Ronald J. Allen ∗
Thank you very much for that gracious introduction, Michael;
and thank you to the organizers and hosts of the conference for inviting me to speak to you today. I can conceive of no higher honor
than to be asked by one’s professional peers to address them on topics central to their scholarly interests, and I am thus at once grateful
to you all for that honor and humbled by the task. I am humbled because the people in this room—and certainly the people who attended this conference, some of whom understandably have now returned to their home cities—collectively are the most gifted and
knowledgeable students of juridical proof and epistemology that have
ever been gathered together under one roof. Many of you are young
scholars and think perhaps my comments do not apply to you, but
they most assuredly do. Your entrance into this field brings with it a
level of academic preparation that is accelerating the transformation
of the field. I have been engaged with the study of evidence for close
to thirty years and have seen close up of what I speak. For the first
half of my career evidence was both a research and teaching backwater, the teaching to be done by whoever was at hand, and the research relegated to the chroniclers of the post-Wigmore era fascinated by such deep questions as whether a statement of state of mind
was not hearsay or an exception to the hearsay rule. In the mid-80s
the complacent view that all the interesting work in the field was
done—much like the proposals at the end of the nineteenth century
to close the patent office because everything that could had already
1
been invented —was exploded first by the probability debates that
moved to the fore the deep questions of rationality and showed that

∗

John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University. This speech
was delivered at the Association of American Law Schools Evidence Conference held
in Cleveland, Ohio, on June 6, 2008.
1
This possibly apocryphal quotation is often attributed to former Patent Commissioner Charles H. Duell. See Samuel Sass, A Patently False Patent Myth, 13 SKEPTICAL
INQUIRER 310 (1989).
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they had not been resolved, followed by the recognition of the contextual nature of human inference, thus opening up the Pandora’s
box of the inadequacy of simple models of knowledge as justified true
belief and of truth amounting to correspondence with an external,
observer-independent (more or less) reality, whatever their philosophical charms. This opened the field to the influences of all forms of
social constructivism, from the Nobel Prize winning work of Kahne3
man and Tversky, to empirical studies of fact finding, to what some4
what ironically are now classic forms of critical theory.
To you youngsters out there, none of this is new, which is exactly
my point about the level of scholarly preparation you now bring to
the field of evidence. And of course you are able to bring this level of
preparation to bear because of the astonishing transformation of the
field of evidence—attributable to your recent predecessors—that has
occurred over the last quarter century that has made clear that the
field of evidence, perhaps like the double helix of DNA fame, wraps
around the deepest empirical and philosophical questions of our
time, questions that we are all now engaged in studying from a wonderful cacophony of perspectives. With great respect to the former
giants of the field, such as my predecessor at Northwestern University, John Henry Wigmore, the field of evidence today is at a level of
creativity and contributions to knowledge unmatched in its history.
And interestingly, almost all of that work is being done in what is
one of the jewels in the crown of western civilization: the American
universities. While I do not purport to be a comparative law scholar,
one looks for both conceptual insights and analytical tools where one
can, and no matter what the language there is simply nothing in the
West remotely comparable to the research programs of the people in
this room. There are a few people here and there, England in particular, and a few elsewhere, pursuing interesting research, but these
are exceptions.
I confess I should be somewhat more diffident than I appear in
discussing the East, for there are vast areas of the world of which I,
2

See, e.g., Symposium, Decision and Inference Litigation, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253
(1991); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377
(1986).
3
Kaheman and Tversky’s work on prospect theory would win Kaheman the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. See Daniel Kaheman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
4
See, e.g., Aviva A. Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159 (1997). There are powerful feminist critiques of Crawford itself. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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and indeed all of us, are largely ignorant. I am aware of the state of
affairs in the two great eastern cultures—Japan and China. I put
aside India because of its British influence. In Japan, a new generation of young scholars largely trained at American universities—
Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, and others—is as we speak introducing the study of evidence to the country. In China, I have been
involved with a group commissioned by the People’s Supreme Court
to create out of whole cloth a rational regulation of evidence at trial.
I say whole cloth advisedly because of the devastating impact of the
Cultural Revolution that wiped out knowledge of western legal systems in China. Lawyers and judges were among the most virulently
attacked during Mao’s madness, with many executed, thousands ban5
ished, law schools closed, and books burned. When Deng Xiaoping
uttered in 1992 what is probably the most significant single sentence
6
any human being has ever uttered, “To be rich is glorious,” it unleashed economic reform in China that has led to its ongoing capitalist transformation. It was not long, however, before the Chinese Government realized that the creation of wealth required a legal system
that enforced rights and obligations, but there was no such system in
place and no legal knowledge adequate to create one. To rectify this,
the Government sent out waves of scholars from Chinese universities
to study in many different countries, including with me at Northwestern, and to bring back to China hopefully useful knowledge. In the
field of evidence, the American approach has provisionally won out,
which is interesting because, to the extent there is a recognizable
western influence on the Chinese legal system, it is Germanic. Two
years ago, the Supreme People’s Court directed the preparation of a
model uniform code of evidence. It has now been promulgated, and
the Court has ordered its provisional adoption in six judicial districts.
In July of 2009, a conference will be held in Beijing to appraise the
results of the field test and hopefully pave the way for the universal
7
adoption of the evidence code.
5

See, e.g., Cynthia Losure Baraban, Note, Inspiring Global Professionalism: Challenges and Opportunities for American Lawyers in China, 73 IND. L.J. 1247, 1257 (“[I]n
1966, Mao set out to destroy the entire legal culture. During the next ten years, a
period known as the Cultural Revolution, Mao . . . . closed all law schools and declared lawyers to be counterrevolutionaries and criminals. . . . Many Chinese lawyers
were executed or sent to labor camps to work in primitive conditions.”). See also
RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 347 (2002) (describing the hardships faced by lawyers during the Cultural Revolution).
6
See, e.g., Cheng Li, Revolution Is No Dinner Party, but China’s Reform Is (1999),
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/red.giant/communism/.
7
Welcome Address: Scientific Theory and Evidence Seminar, http://www.icelfs.
com/English/newsList.aspx?id=115&n_kind=1 (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).
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So, I return to why I address you with some diffidence. Unlike
the famous quote when President John F. Kennedy welcomed fortynine Nobel Prize winners to the White House in 1962 and said he
thought it was “the most extraordinary collection of talent, of human
knowledge, that has ever been gathered together at the White House,
8
with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined alone,”
you are the most extraordinary collection of talent and knowledge
pertaining to juridical proof that the world has ever seen. Two things
at least are responsible for this, in addition to your own interests.
One is our jury system, of course, that divides responsibility for fact
finding over various actors, thus necessitating the systemic treatment
of evidence. But the other is these great American universities that
provide you the opportunity to engage in the work that you are doing. Nowhere else in the world would you have comfortable salaries,
a surplus of free time, and encouragement to engage in this kind of
work, and frankly, if nothing else I say today has any effect or significance—and of course the primary point I have been making so far is
that it is not at all clear what I could contribute to your knowledge
and understanding—I hope that at least each of you will reflect, however briefly, on how such privilege carries with it a deep responsibility
to increase, however incrementally, the store of human knowledge
through your research and perpetuate it through your teaching.
How does all this tie to the Enlightenment? And from that chaotic human period to the recent Supreme Court cases of Crawford
9
and Holmes? Good question. And the answer is the primacy of facts,
which is the central concern of the field of evidence. Facts are primary in any coherent study of evidence, obviously, but they are primary in an even deeper manner for they are the foundation upon
which western civilization rests. Even though the field of evidence
has undergone a renaissance, it still lacks the panache and status of
constitutional law, yet in my opinion it is both more fundamental and
more important. Those, surely, seem like rather bold claims, and I
wonder how many of you would have agreed with them prior to today. I think if you asked most well-educated citizens, including law
professors, what best characterizes our form of government and its
handmaiden the legal system, the answer typically would have some8

See MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL KAZAN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR OF
1960s, at 61 (2004).
9
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
U.S. 319 (2006). Crawford has been the subject of so much scholarship that I have
kept citations to the bare minimum. To be fair to the academy would require a footnote of references two or three pages long. Interestingly, Holmes has been the subject of virtually no scholarship, which is yet another reason for stringent citations.
THE
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thing to do with constitutionalism on the one hand and, on the other, rights and obligations. You might say something about the rule of
law, and if you were attempting to impress you might refer to the central contribution of the Magna Carta to Anglo-American forms of
government that even the King was bound by the law—and you might
of course bemoan the damage you think done to that concept by the
Bush Administration. If you really got into it, you might fast forward
to the Enlightenment and point out that what was nascent in 1215 in
English history became explicit in the eighteenth century when Enlightenment thinkers inverted the old order of things to make the
10
state the servant of the people, rather than the other way around.
And you might end your disquisition with the astonishing rhetorical
flourish of quoting the last, deeply moving letter written by Thomas
Jefferson on June 24, 1826, to Roger C. Weightman, in which with
palpable regret Mr. Jefferson had to decline the invitation to travel to
Washington, D.C., to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the signing
of the Declaration of Independence:
[M]ay it [the Declaration of Independence] be to the world, what
I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the Signal of arousing men to burst the chains under
which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them
to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings & security of selfgovernment. . . . All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of
man. [T]he general spread of the light of science has already laid
open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind
has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few
booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace
11
of god.

Indeed, the creation of the United States, with its rule of law, separation of powers, limited and shared government, and its articulation of various individual rights in the body of the Constitution and
its Bill of Rights is sometimes seen as the crowning achievement of

10

The idea of the state as social contract entered into by its citizens was of course
popularized by John Locke. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Notably, Madison relied greatly on the
shift from a sovereign government to a sovereign people in justifying his opposition
to the Alien and Sedition Acts. JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS
(1800), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 141 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987). For a general overview of enlightenment thought, see ERNST
CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelln & James P. Pettegrove trans., 1951) (1932).
11
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman (June 24, 1826) (material
is quoted exactly as it appeared in Mr. Jefferson’s letter, except for the bracketed
terms), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/214.html.
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the Enlightenment in which the potential of rationality to improve
the human condition finally reached full flower. The significance of
the political side of the Enlightenment can even be seen in the famous essay by Immanuel Kant that named the period to which he
12
contributed much, “What is Enlightenment?,” in which the answer
that he gave to the question was simply freedom to use one’s own intelligence. His opening paragraph captures its main theme:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from self imposed immaturity
for which he himself was responsible. Immaturity and dependence are the inability to use one’s own intellect without the direction of another. One is responsible for this immaturity and dependence, if its cause is not a lack of intelligence, but a lack of
determination and courage to think without the direction of another. Sapere aude! Dare to know! is therefore the slogan of the
13
Enlightenment.

In my opinion, and with all due respect to Mr. Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence, the right to think without the direction of
another reached its zenith in the brilliant innovation of the U.S. Constitution that memorialized sovereignty possessed by the people with
rights granted to the government rather than being an attribute of
government that permitted it to impress its will upon its subjects.
But, here is the critical point, or rather the background to the
critical point: the political side of the Enlightenment grew out of its
epistemological revolution, which finally saw the supplanting of
dogmatic and revelatory sources of knowledge with rational empiri14
To be sure, any Reader’s Digest-like review of complex phecism.
nomena, such as I am engaging in here, will be rough and crude. For
example, English empiricism traces its roots at least to Francis Bacon,
and one can argue whether he should be thought of as the end of the
Renaissance or the beginning of the Enlightenment. Whatever. By
the time of the American Revolution, it was the promise of the application of systematic thinking of the kind that had revolutionized what
we call science and they called natural philosophy that was being put
to use to revolutionize the relationship between the state and the citizen. But, and here is truly the critical point, the significance of empiricism goes much deeper than just lending tools of rational inquiry
to political science. The work product of political science depends
12

Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784), reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (H.S. Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2nd ed.
1991).
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., Gary Hatfield, Epistemology, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT10–20 (Alan Charles Kors ed., 2005).
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on rational empiricism, or more startlingly put, factual accuracy is
more fundamental than rights and obligations because, conversely,
they are parasitic on factual accuracy.
Take a simple example, but one at the heart of the political and
epistemological currents we are discussing—the existence of property. What does it mean to own something—like the shirts, blouses,
pants, and dresses that each of you is wearing? The conventional,
law-schoolesque answer is that you have the right to possess, alienate,
control, and consume that physical item. Fine. But what happens
when I demand that you give me the shirt off your back because I assert it is mine? You will scurry around and find a fact finder to whom
you will present evidence of sale, gift, creation, discovery, whatever, to
convince the fact finder that the universe was in a certain state at a
certain time such that you rather than I have the right to possess,
consume, etcetera.
Generalize this point. Rights and obligations of any sort whatsoever are meaningless without accurate fact finding. It doesn’t matter
whether the question is the age of the President, the powers distributed to different branches of government, the right to be free from
torture, or your rights to possess, consume, and dispose of your
clothes. It is the attachment of rights and obligations to the bedrock
of facts—to how the universe actually was at a particular moment in
time—that gives them substance. This is the single most significant
feature distinguishing western liberal democracies and their market
economies from eastern autocratic states and their centralized economies—and the consequences are obvious and predictable.
Thus, those who study and advance our knowledge of evidence
are not just arguing over the proper conception of statements about
states of mind but instead laying the ground work for the progression
of western civilization. Nothing is more fundamental than the work
that you all do in your classes and your research, for without it everything is vanity.
15
16
Now to Crawford and Holmes. These two cases are fascinating
for many reasons. They pose interesting doctrinal questions about
confrontation and the regulation of the inferential process at trial,
Crawford holding that testimonial statements at trial may be used only
if the accused has or has had the right to confront the person making
the statements, and Holmes concluding that due process is violated by
excluding plausible evidence that a third party committed a crime
15
16

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
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whenever the State’s evidence against the defendant is “strong.”
They pose perhaps even more interesting questions about the nature
of constitutional interpretation generally, and they pose startling
questions about the significance of accurate fact finding at trial. Most
interestingly of all, excluding the doctrinal holdings, the answers they
give to each of these questions are quite at odds with each other.
To discuss the first question—the nature of constitutional interpretation—I must replace my evidence with my constitutional criminal procedure hat. To summarize what I will briefly discuss, as a general matter, and certainly as applicable to these two cases, in my years
of teaching and writing in the field of constitutional criminal procedure, the only good theory of any general import that I have come
across is Oliver Wendell Holmes’s general proposition that no gen17
eral proposition is worth a damn, not at least to the questions that
have risen to the Supreme Court since the beginning of the procedural revolution in the late 1950s. We have to do another Reader’s Digest approach to complicated questions, but please bear with me.
Roughly and crudely put, there are five general approaches to constitutional exegesis:
A. Text (literalism)
B. Originalism (meaning, intent, linguistic historicism generally)
C. Structural questions (e.g. separation of powers)
D. History
18
E. Policy (utility, morality, whatever)

So far as I can see, we can put aside structural issues, leaving us four.
“Policy” is actually the opposite of an interpretive theory because it
does the opposite of what interpretative theories are supposed to do,
which is constrain decision. Thus, we are down to three, and none of
them help very much in deciding the cases the Court is deciding today for a quite general and pervasive reason: today’s world bears almost no relationship to that of 1791 or 1868. Moreover, there is no
evidence, literally none, that what was uppermost on any of the drafters’ or ratifiers’ minds in dealing with individual rights was a general
theoretical approach to a problem rather than provisions dealing
with discrete, highly-contextualized political problems.

17

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollack (Sept. 9, 1904), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 59 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941).
18
For considerably more sophisticated detail, see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) and PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
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Just to set the stage, consider wiretapping. Electromagnetic
transmittal of information was not even dreamt of in 1791, and, to
the extent it existed in 1868, it had no claim to privacy—telegraph
wires were open and anyone could receive a signal. What sense can
even be made, then, of the question, “How does the Fourth Amendment—or the Due Process Clause—apply to wiretapping?” Whatever
answer one gives will have to be made up. As I will return to in just a
minute, one can make up better or worse answers, but they will still
be made up.
Now consider the world of 1791. Criminal cases in England in
the century preceding 1791 consisted roughly of three types: state trials for treason, political and religious persecution, and run of the mill
criminality. There were certain abusive procedures employed in the
first two categories that were plainly on the minds of the founding
19
generation, such as the prosecution of Walter Raleigh, oaths ex offi20
cio prior to formal charges or the disclosure of allegations, torture
and so on, but these were essentially nonexistent in the third category
of crime, which involved private rather than state prosecution.
Moreover, counsel not only was not the norm in common criminal
cases but in many instances was disallowed. Those cases were basically all eyewitness cases with no investigative resources allocated to
either side. Cross-examination was known, but without counsel or
other aids it did not amount to much. Moreover, the highly skilled
and intense examination that we use the phrase “cross-examination”
to refer to is largely a product of the nineteenth century. And in any
event, in cases of felony, the Marian statutes required committing
magistrates to take formal statement of witnesses, and those state21
As
ments were admissible at trial if the witness was unavailable.
Tom Davies has demonstrated, the Marian statutes were part of the
22
law the colonies inherited from Britain.
Again, think Reader’s Digest, for there are immense complexities
here, but nonetheless, as the Court in Crawford rather candidly said,
“The most notorious instances of civil-law examination occurred in
23
the great political trials of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”
19

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
And there is some historical evidence that the “point” of the Sixth Amendment
was to ensure the validity of charges, i.e., that accusers had actually made them. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Comment, Reading the Text of the Confrontation Clause: “To Be” or
“Not to Be”?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 722 (2001).
21
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
22
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know t? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
23
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
20
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And the abuses that were prevalent were abusive indeed, such as Raleigh being marched to his death without Lord Cobham being
24
Or consider another case that figures
brought from the Tower.
large in the Crawford opinion: “Fenwick’s counsel objected to admitting the examination of a witness who had been spirited away, on the
25
ground that Fenwick had had no opportunity to cross-examine.” By
contrast, in run-of-the-mill felony cases, witness statements were regularly used.
Now, think about the implications of this for our three remaining sources of constitutional interpretation—text, originalism, and
history. First, there is literally no applicable text with any determi26
nate meaning in Holmes. Much like Griswold v. Connecticut’s flailing
away in a search for pertinent text, the Court in Holmes said, “This latitude [to control the admission of evidence], however, has limits.
‘Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal de27
fendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”
Somewhere, in short, we find this idea, which is not, I would think,
very comforting for those committed to textual sources.
The Confrontation Clause, by contrast, is sometimes suggested
to be clear in its application to a case like Crawford, although to its
credit the Court acknowledges to the contrary. And the Court is
right, although for reasons that, in my opinion, the Court does not
give. As some have noted, the Confrontation Clause, like the entire
Sixth Amendment, is in the passive voice with the elided phrase being
“by the Government,” presumably. Thus, what the clause means to
“literalist”—how can anyone emending language to give it meaning
be a literalist?—is that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
28
confronted with the witnesses against him [by the government].”
Yet the “literal language” of the Sixth Amendment is supposed to say,
“The defendant has the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
him.” Those are obviously quite different and, if the latter was truly
meant, it easily could have been said.
At a somewhat higher level of generality, the modern problem
has nothing to do with allegations of treason and political or religious
24

Id.
Id. at 45 (citing Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591–92 (H.C. 1696)).
26
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding the right to privacy in the “penumbras” and
“emanations” of the Bill of Rights).
27
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 319 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (2006)).
28
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
25
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persecution. The modern problem is standard criminality ranging,
to be sure, from the petty to the serious, but still it is not focused on
cases like Raleigh’s or the use of governmental power to suppress
matters of conscience. Moreover, all cases are surrounded by a web
of procedural protection that was unthinkable in 1791 and 1868: the
right to counsel, appeal, investigatory assistance, limits on interrogation, discovery, public and speedy trial rights, limits on the use of prejudicial evidence, restrictions on judicial control of jury verdicts, and
on and on. I suggest it is literally a nonsensical question to ask what
the fixed meaning of the language of the Sixth Amendment is as applied to this entity that previously did not exist and was not contemplated. Moreover, to the extent the modern trial has a historical analogue, it is to the trial of common-place felonies in which witness
statements were widely used.
Going up the generality chain, the Confrontation Clause is part
of the Sixth Amendment, and read as a whole the Sixth Amendment
plainly is directed precisely at cases like Raleigh, the political persecutions of the royal courts, and the religious persecutions of the High
Commission. What justification there is to take this one clause out of
context in the service of an illusive literalism, ignoring its surroundings that give it meaning if anything does, is completely unclear.
What I have said of textualism presages and perhaps disposes of
originalism and historicism, at least so far as Crawford is concerned.
The text is unhelpful because the problems being addressed were different; there is neither original meaning to capture nor any pertinent
historical evidence. If the Government today were to try a case solely
through affidavits or having “spirited away” a significant witness to
stop him from being examined in court, it would be a different matter. But those historical abuses bear no relationship to what is at
stake today in American criminal procedure. Moreover, there is a
critical difference between a right and its implementation. It is one
thing for the government to affirmatively deny the defendant access
to information; it is quite another for the government not to affirmatively provide it: the First Amendment does not mean government
must subsidize speech; individuals can waive the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments without knowing they have the right not to; the right to
procreate does not mean that the government must assist in the
process; the right to life is not violated when government does not
29
protect you; and so on. Crawford itself is a perfect example: how can
anyone claim that the government denied him access to his wife? In
29

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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any event, we have literally no knowledge of how any drafter or ratifier of the Constitution would react to anything like the facts of Crawford or 911 calls, or statements by minors concerning sexual abuse, or
lab reports, and especially not in the context of modern criminal
procedure which guarantees much more than the drafters ever would
have imagined.
At the highest level of generality, Crawford also embodies the
deep philosophical question of the relationship between a rule and
its underlying reasons. Suppose that you were convinced that the
Confrontation Clause was designed to stop cases like Raleigh. What
do you suppose the problem might have been? Simply that crossexamination had not occurred and, thus, that it would have been fine
to call Cobham and then cut off Walter’s head? Or do you suppose
that the problem was that Raleigh faced trumped up charges that
would have likely been exposed had Cobham been called? These
questions answer themselves. There is no reason to think that the
Sixth Amendment reflects a fetish for cross-examination rather than
a concern about reliability during a time when unreliable outcomes
were relatively easy to manufacture. What, then, is the meaning of
the Amendment? Is it that each of the identified procedures must be
provided regardless of the effect on reliability, or is that they were a
rough estimation made 217 years ago in drastically different times of
what might be useful palliatives to stop the abuses of the time? And if
the latter, what is the rule that emerges that should be applied in our
time and under our conditions? Is it these particularized procedures
ripped from their historical context, or is it the underlying rationale
that animates them? This is not an easy question, for the answer that
one gravitates to—that reasons should dominate—has the capacity to
make rules superfluous. Still, the farther one gets from the actual
conditions anticipated by the rule, the greater the justification for
looking to its animating spirit.
Interestingly, the procedure in Holmes, as described by the
Court, was so weird that it too had no obvious analogues in historical
practice. As described by the Court:
[u]nder this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the probative
value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense
evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical inquiry concerns
the strength of the prosecution's case: If the prosecution’s case is
strong enough, the evidence of third-party guilt is excluded even
if that evidence, if viewed independently, would have great proba-
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tive value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harass30
ment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.

Quite frankly, this seems more like a violation of the literal text of the
Sixth Amendment than do the facts of Crawford, as it denies the right
to present a defense. As to originalism and history, the lack of a clear
textual source for the constitutional command the Court constructs is
pretty good evidence of equivalent lack of any evidence of either, and
the Court produces literally none.
That leaves policy, and here the cases stand in interesting and
stark contrast. Holmes advances factual accuracy, and Crawford almost
surely retards it. It is almost surely the case that Crawford himself was
guilty, and the cases coming in the wake of Crawford are not indicative
of an abusive government trying to frame innocent people. The real
question seems to be how far commitment to the peculiar form of
constitutional exegesis found in Crawford will be allowed to get in the
way of sensible outcomes. This is not to say that the reliability stan31
dard of Ohio v. Roberts did not result in erroneous outcomes; it is
merely to say that, comparing the pre- and post-Crawford regimes, it is
hard to see how factual accuracy will be advanced. The exact opposite is true of Holmes; indeed, it is hard to fathom what might have
possessed the courts of South Carolina.
There are other interesting policy differences between Holmes
and Crawford. All Holmes commits one to is the right of a defendant
to present a defense. The Court was at pains to point out that the
conventional regulation of the evidentiary process was not at stake;
32
thus, rules like FRE 403 or 413 through 415 are not called into question. There will be some ambiguity at the edges of wholesale and retail regulation of the evidentiary process, but probably not very much.
Crawford, by contrast, commits one to an astonishing roll back of
modern criminal procedure jurisprudence. As Donald Dripps has
33
developed in detail, the interpretive methodology of Crawford of
searching for some foregone historical meaning would emasculate
34
the entire line of right to counsel cases from Gideon forward—
35
indeed from Powell forward. It also makes mincemeat out of Miran-

30

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 320.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
32
FED. R. EVID. 403, 413–15.
33
Donald Dripps, Sixth Amendment Originalism’s Collision Course with the Right to
Counsel: What’s Titanic, What’s Iceberg? (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 07-79,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952508.
34
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31
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36

da, for which there are no historical analogues from either 1791 or
1868. Habeas corpus would revert to being limited to challenging
37
the jurisdiction of the incarcerating authority. Brady v. Maryland
38
would be a dead letter, as would almost all of the post-Katz Fourth
Amendment doctrine. It is rather hard to say with a straight face that
textualism, originalism, or historicism result in the regulation of
something nobody thought about until one hundred or so years later.
Perhaps it is some solace that capital punishment would survive unscathed, whether conducted by lethal injection, hanging, or firing
squad. Oh, yes, and challenges to the racial makeup of grand and
petit juries would not be allowed.
Perhaps all this is simply the cost of other advantages that may
flow from the decision—after all, factual accuracy is not the exclusive
concern—but only two have been identified. One is that the holding
39
of Ohio v. Roberts was ambiguous, which is certainly true. Whether
this is a benefit depends on the alternative, and it is becoming painfully obvious that the Crawford regime will be subject to just as much,
40
if not more, ambiguity as what it replaces. Indeed, we now have the
spectacle of deciding what is testimonial by the oxymoronic standard
of what, objectively speaking, the primary purpose of a government/citizen interaction might be. If it is to yield help, resulting
statements are not testimonial; if it is to investigate, they are.
Those of you who do not study constitutional criminal procedure might justifiably wonder where this weird standard has come
from. What can it possibly mean to look at what, objectively speaking,
someone’s internal motivations might be? And where in the Constitution is that peculiar line drawn? The answer is that this is an effort
41
to borrow from the Fourth Amendment special needs cases, where
the primary purpose of legislation or general law enforcement techniques can determine the constitutionality of state action. At the
same time, the Court has rigorously avoided allowing the subjective
state of mind of individual officers to be the determining criterion,
precisely because of the daunting task of piercing the mind of an36

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
38
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
40
See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 813–16 (2007).
41
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (suspicion-less roadblocks only allowed to serve “special needs” not regular law enforcement); Michigan
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 440 (1990) (random sobriety checkpoints are
constitutional); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (allowing warrantless inventory searches of impounded cars).
37
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other. But there is no general purpose to the government actions
that will give rise to Crawford claims. For example, 911 calls have both
attributes, as do lab reports, and statements by children reporting
sexual abuse, and so on. Recognizing this, the Court has to, but does
not want to, refer to internal intentional states, and thus this bastardized quasi-objective, quasi-subjective test.
I think there are deeper issues ahead, frankly. The Court has,
apparently unknowingly, walked into a jurisprudential minefield.
Virtually all knowledge is “testimonial” or rests on the “testimony” of
42
other, as Coady in his book, Testimony has pointed out convincingly.
Consider, for example, the presentation of DNA testimony at trial
showing a high probability that a specimen matches the defendant’s
DNA, and assume the lab technician that has run the tests shows-up
and is cross-examined. All she can be cross-examined about is the results that emerge from following certain protocols. She can’t testify
about the theory of DNA. Suppose she could; how does she know it is
true? Who is really doing the testifying here? Obviously the scientists
who have convinced their peers of the truth of their account of DNA,
but they won’t be testifying at trial.
But, the retort comes, they don’t have to testify because they
were not thinking of testifying when they did their experiments.
What if they were? What if the people in some research center are
aware that their work may have legal implications, as frankly virtually
all research today might? More importantly, in an effort to avoid
“ambiguity” it seems as though the Court simply has recapitulated the
troublesome problem in the hearsay rule involving the intent to assert: if a person intends to assert, it’s hearsay; if not, maybe not. I
doubt anyone with experience with that aspect of the hearsay rule will
think that the “primary motive, objectively determined” standard is
likely to be less ambiguous than the straight forward question about
reliability that Roberts asks. An example of the enormous ambiguity
Roberts injects into the system is the recent Seventh Circuit case of
43
United States v. Moon, concluding that, since experts can testify on
the basis of inadmissible data, Crawford may be avoided, and that, in
44
any event, readings from tests are not testimonial.
That leaves the last possible advantage of the Crawford regime,
which is that it has in fact greater fidelity to the constitutional language. I must confess that, were I convinced of this being true, I
would put aside all my objections. At the heart of the argument that I
42
43
44

C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1992).
512 F.3d 359 (2008).
Id. at 361–62.
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have been making here is that constitutional interpretation is not really interpretation; it is prudence. For reasons I have given, I largely
believe that. At the same time, it is troublesome, for it makes the existence of the written language largely irrelevant. To some extent,
Crawford represents a struggle over the proper role of courts, and as
ironic as it may sound, I am largely on Scalia’s side. I prefer democratic to authoritarian sources of law. I just do not see how to recapture our lost innocence without declaring that the Constitution has
become largely irrelevant. Thus, constitutional law is primarily prudence with some guideposts alone the way.
Now at the conclusion, let me switch my hats again, and retake
the mantle of an evidence professor. If any question, constitutional
or otherwise, is going to be fought out over the field of policy, the
single most important policy is factual accuracy. There may be other
values, and at the end of the day they may outweigh the gains to factual accuracy that may be at play in some policy choice, but it is our
job to ensure that the primacy of facts is never neglected.
Thank you.

